1. CRs [continuing resolutions], cuts, and single year procurement screw with demand signal for industry. The defense sector still runs on some version of supply and demand and has for years (up until Ukraine 2022) been running on minimum sustaining rates (MSRs) for most munitions and systems. These are production rates that are the absolute minimum needed to keep a certain production line alive.
2. It takes time to get those production lines, like any business with highly skilled workers, time to get up and running and there has to be continuous demand signal for companies to invest in them (or a lot of money to do so in spite of that lack of demand). In some cases, the physical technical skill needed to design and produce more of certain weapons system may be lost to time. The inability of Congress to deliver budgets on time and, particularly during the sequestration era, to deliver them without massive slashing cuts, sends the wrong signals (obviously). We can’t just keep engineers and technicians on ice until war breaks out.
3. So when you get CRs, which usually match the previous topline from the last fiscal year (sometimes you get some extra thrown in for priority operations, which is hard to forecast for) you eat into both the Pentagon and industry’s ability to do what any other business does: plan, forecast, request, produce, and deliver to the needs of the customer. Sure, some will say the new budget will come around eventually, but by the time it does half of the fiscal year will have already been consumed by a CR. This is no way to run a business, let alone the US government and especially not the US military.
4. Additionally, because those CRs usually match last year’s topline, they don’t often account not just for inflation but also for other increases in the price of munitions, spare parts, etc due to other confounding factors like contract renegotiations, cost overruns, production delays (because you had a CR last year too). Spare parts shortfalls and delays are the most significant impact to readiness other than munitions, and can impact us on Day 1 of a war when half the fleet is down for maintenance.
5. In aggregate, for the last 15 years, the DoD budget has not truly shifted to reflect strategic realities, it has not had the time or funds to build up stockpiles of munitions that can kill aircraft, ships, and target and strike in denied environments to levels that would be expended in a fight against the People’s Liberation Army. Instead of real, multi-year procurement orders, an executable shipbuilding plan and budget (this is not all on Congress), training programs for workers, a force structure realignment that matches strategy and so on…what we get is a Potemkin village of national security policy that seeks only to fool ourselves, generate press, and make everyone feel like they “did something.”
6. Some appropriators will blame the DoD for not asking for more (they do), but DoD also asks Congress for what it *thinks* it can get and that isn’t always tied to operational realities. The sequestration and GWOT years broke a lot of morale and lot of brains. So even when funds are available, they aren’t always allocated correctly or are left without a champion especially once district and special interest priorities are factored in. Splitting the policy and appropriations committees remains a serious impediment to any real budget reform or restructuring.
7. And again, for a lot of these programs (minus shipbuilding) we really didn’t need to raise the topline beyond inflation. We just needed to settle down and actually assess priorities instead of sprinkling a little money around to everyone. Our inability to prioritize and make budgetary sacrifices reminds me of Frederick the Great’s comment about how in defending everything, you defend nothing. We have to pick our battles before the enemy chooses them for us.
!ping Materiel&foreign-policy
PearlClaw on
Man I wish congress was a functional legislative body.
2 Comments
1. CRs [continuing resolutions], cuts, and single year procurement screw with demand signal for industry. The defense sector still runs on some version of supply and demand and has for years (up until Ukraine 2022) been running on minimum sustaining rates (MSRs) for most munitions and systems. These are production rates that are the absolute minimum needed to keep a certain production line alive.
2. It takes time to get those production lines, like any business with highly skilled workers, time to get up and running and there has to be continuous demand signal for companies to invest in them (or a lot of money to do so in spite of that lack of demand). In some cases, the physical technical skill needed to design and produce more of certain weapons system may be lost to time. The inability of Congress to deliver budgets on time and, particularly during the sequestration era, to deliver them without massive slashing cuts, sends the wrong signals (obviously). We can’t just keep engineers and technicians on ice until war breaks out.
3. So when you get CRs, which usually match the previous topline from the last fiscal year (sometimes you get some extra thrown in for priority operations, which is hard to forecast for) you eat into both the Pentagon and industry’s ability to do what any other business does: plan, forecast, request, produce, and deliver to the needs of the customer. Sure, some will say the new budget will come around eventually, but by the time it does half of the fiscal year will have already been consumed by a CR. This is no way to run a business, let alone the US government and especially not the US military.
4. Additionally, because those CRs usually match last year’s topline, they don’t often account not just for inflation but also for other increases in the price of munitions, spare parts, etc due to other confounding factors like contract renegotiations, cost overruns, production delays (because you had a CR last year too). Spare parts shortfalls and delays are the most significant impact to readiness other than munitions, and can impact us on Day 1 of a war when half the fleet is down for maintenance.
5. In aggregate, for the last 15 years, the DoD budget has not truly shifted to reflect strategic realities, it has not had the time or funds to build up stockpiles of munitions that can kill aircraft, ships, and target and strike in denied environments to levels that would be expended in a fight against the People’s Liberation Army. Instead of real, multi-year procurement orders, an executable shipbuilding plan and budget (this is not all on Congress), training programs for workers, a force structure realignment that matches strategy and so on…what we get is a Potemkin village of national security policy that seeks only to fool ourselves, generate press, and make everyone feel like they “did something.”
6. Some appropriators will blame the DoD for not asking for more (they do), but DoD also asks Congress for what it *thinks* it can get and that isn’t always tied to operational realities. The sequestration and GWOT years broke a lot of morale and lot of brains. So even when funds are available, they aren’t always allocated correctly or are left without a champion especially once district and special interest priorities are factored in. Splitting the policy and appropriations committees remains a serious impediment to any real budget reform or restructuring.
7. And again, for a lot of these programs (minus shipbuilding) we really didn’t need to raise the topline beyond inflation. We just needed to settle down and actually assess priorities instead of sprinkling a little money around to everyone. Our inability to prioritize and make budgetary sacrifices reminds me of Frederick the Great’s comment about how in defending everything, you defend nothing. We have to pick our battles before the enemy chooses them for us.
!ping Materiel&foreign-policy
Man I wish congress was a functional legislative body.
Republicans delenda est.