I’ve been studying the fall of Taisho Democracy and the military factions intentionally took cues from the Imperial German army in their efforts to subsume the state. One of the golden keys to power they spent the late Taisho period aggressively pursuing was requiring the war minister to be an active duty military officer. Since the cabinet was already unaccountable to the Diet, this would completely cut dissenting voices out of military command. Retirees, reservists, and civilian theorists were able to hold the office until they achieved this in 1936, and suddenly there was an unbroken chain of jingoism from the very top to the very bottom, with nobody with the power to tell the army not to invade China again.
Rethious on
Today, we’re talking about civil-military relations and how they’re affected by personalities and, the crowd favorite, *institutions*! (Distant rabid cheering from the Acemoglu-stans). Bismarck and the German Wars of Unification are an interesting case study in how pretty much completely busted institutions can still achieve stunning victories. At same the time, it shows that a productive alignment of personalities can conceal the deep flaws in institutions, leaving a crisis to future generations.
We also go into the effects of worldview of foreign policy, contrasting Bismarck and Moltke’s emphasis on uncertainty, self-confidence, and flexibility with the fatalism and Darwinism of their successors.
This is also my first collaborative post, with the brilliant [secretaryofdefenserock](https://substack.com/@secretaryofdefenserock) (whose other posts you should definitely check out!) It was a very enjoyable experience, so if anyone else is interested in writing something collaboratively, definitely reach out!
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I’ve been studying the fall of Taisho Democracy and the military factions intentionally took cues from the Imperial German army in their efforts to subsume the state. One of the golden keys to power they spent the late Taisho period aggressively pursuing was requiring the war minister to be an active duty military officer. Since the cabinet was already unaccountable to the Diet, this would completely cut dissenting voices out of military command. Retirees, reservists, and civilian theorists were able to hold the office until they achieved this in 1936, and suddenly there was an unbroken chain of jingoism from the very top to the very bottom, with nobody with the power to tell the army not to invade China again.
Today, we’re talking about civil-military relations and how they’re affected by personalities and, the crowd favorite, *institutions*! (Distant rabid cheering from the Acemoglu-stans). Bismarck and the German Wars of Unification are an interesting case study in how pretty much completely busted institutions can still achieve stunning victories. At same the time, it shows that a productive alignment of personalities can conceal the deep flaws in institutions, leaving a crisis to future generations.
We also go into the effects of worldview of foreign policy, contrasting Bismarck and Moltke’s emphasis on uncertainty, self-confidence, and flexibility with the fatalism and Darwinism of their successors.
This is also my first collaborative post, with the brilliant [secretaryofdefenserock](https://substack.com/@secretaryofdefenserock) (whose other posts you should definitely check out!) It was a very enjoyable experience, so if anyone else is interested in writing something collaboratively, definitely reach out!
!ping MILITARY&HISTORY&INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS