***What lessons is China learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine?” is a question that preoccupies many senior policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals. The hope is that Russia’s experience in Ukraine will deter Beijing from invading Taiwan. But Beijing may be drawing different conclusions in the third year of this gruelling war than it did in the first. And the lessons China’s leaders are learning may be the opposite of those the White House wants them to learn.***
However, sometimes there are things in war that we can be certain about. I would propose that one certainty of the Russo-Ukraine war is that China is watching it closely. In particular, it is learning to improve its strategic decision models (within the bounds of the CCP system) by watching U.S. and NATO decision-making and responses to the Ukraine war. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan is also prompting Western debates which inform China’s strategic calculus.
I have explored the topic of Chinese learning from the Ukraine War in several previous articles. My first examination of China’s potential observations from the war in Ukraine was published back in April 2022. This was designed as short, initial exploration of what China might learn from the conflict. A year later, in February 2023, I undertook another exploration of how China might be using the war in Ukraine to wargame its own future operations. Finally, in September last year I published a piece here that proposed multiple areas where the Chinese leadership might be learning from the war in Ukraine.
Nearly a year later, I wanted to provide an assessment on one particular aspect of China’s (potential) learning from the war in Ukraine that has political and strategic impact. As such, in this article I will examine how China might be learning from how the West (the U.S. and NATO in particular) have made strategic decisions during the war, up to the latest debate on long range strike, and how this will inform and influence Chinese strategic decision-making.
**China Learns from Foreign Wars**
> *The PLA are careful and meticulous students of modern warfare, particularly the U.S. way of war. But despite recent organizational reform efforts, the PLA remains essentially a political entity with a war-fighting mission. It is a party army, not a national army. And its approach to learning and leadership is heavily influenced by its own organization, as well as traditional Chinese culture and education.*
China, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have previously demonstrated both the willingness and ability for learning and change. In 2023, Toshi Yoshihara examined China’s study of the lessons of the Pacific War. As he writes in his report, published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies,:
> Chinese analysts, including those affiliated with the PLA, have subjected the maritime conflict and its campaigns to scrutiny. The historical accounts render clear and sound judgments about the sources of operational success that in turn reveal much about the PLA’s views of strategy and war… Chinese findings from these retrospectives offer tantalizing hints of the PLA’s deeply held beliefs, assumptions, and proclivities about future warfare, such as the penchant for striking first and attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities.
[…]
China has an evolved capability to study and learn from other people’s wars. Partially this is due to necessity; China has not been involved in large-scale war since its disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979. The poor performance of the PLA in that war saw Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping use it to overcome resistance from PLA leadership for the modernisation of China’s military. But China has since then used its studies of other peoples’ war to inform change in the PLA. The most recent conventional war in Ukraine, like the other wars discussed above, provides an array of lessons. And perhaps the most important lesson is how Western nations make decisions about war.
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Summary:
***What lessons is China learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine?” is a question that preoccupies many senior policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals. The hope is that Russia’s experience in Ukraine will deter Beijing from invading Taiwan. But Beijing may be drawing different conclusions in the third year of this gruelling war than it did in the first. And the lessons China’s leaders are learning may be the opposite of those the White House wants them to learn.***
*[Xi Jinping Has Learned a Lot From the War in Ukraine](https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-has-learned-a-lot-from-the-war-in-ukraine-putin-west-8434b4ca)*, Alexander Gabuev
[…]
However, sometimes there are things in war that we can be certain about. I would propose that one certainty of the Russo-Ukraine war is that China is watching it closely. In particular, it is learning to improve its strategic decision models (within the bounds of the CCP system) by watching U.S. and NATO decision-making and responses to the Ukraine war. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan is also prompting Western debates which inform China’s strategic calculus.
I have explored the topic of Chinese learning from the Ukraine War in several previous articles. My first examination of China’s potential observations from the war in Ukraine was published back in April 2022. This was designed as short, initial exploration of what China might learn from the conflict. A year later, in February 2023, I undertook another exploration of how China might be using the war in Ukraine to wargame its own future operations. Finally, in September last year I published a piece here that proposed multiple areas where the Chinese leadership might be learning from the war in Ukraine.
Nearly a year later, I wanted to provide an assessment on one particular aspect of China’s (potential) learning from the war in Ukraine that has political and strategic impact. As such, in this article I will examine how China might be learning from how the West (the U.S. and NATO in particular) have made strategic decisions during the war, up to the latest debate on long range strike, and how this will inform and influence Chinese strategic decision-making.
**China Learns from Foreign Wars**
> *The PLA are careful and meticulous students of modern warfare, particularly the U.S. way of war. But despite recent organizational reform efforts, the PLA remains essentially a political entity with a war-fighting mission. It is a party army, not a national army. And its approach to learning and leadership is heavily influenced by its own organization, as well as traditional Chinese culture and education.*
> [What the Chinese Army Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine War](https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/07/what-the-chinese-army-is-learning-from-russias-ukraine-war?lang=en), Evan A. Feigenbaum and Charles Hooper
China, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have previously demonstrated both the willingness and ability for learning and change. In 2023, Toshi Yoshihara examined China’s study of the lessons of the Pacific War. As he writes in his report, published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies,:
> Chinese analysts, including those affiliated with the PLA, have subjected the maritime conflict and its campaigns to scrutiny. The historical accounts render clear and sound judgments about the sources of operational success that in turn reveal much about the PLA’s views of strategy and war… Chinese findings from these retrospectives offer tantalizing hints of the PLA’s deeply held beliefs, assumptions, and proclivities about future warfare, such as the penchant for striking first and attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities.
[…]
China has an evolved capability to study and learn from other people’s wars. Partially this is due to necessity; China has not been involved in large-scale war since its disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979. The poor performance of the PLA in that war saw Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping use it to overcome resistance from PLA leadership for the modernisation of China’s military. But China has since then used its studies of other peoples’ war to inform change in the PLA. The most recent conventional war in Ukraine, like the other wars discussed above, provides an array of lessons. And perhaps the most important lesson is how Western nations make decisions about war.
!ping Foreign-policy